We study goodness-of-fit of discrete distributions in the distributed setting, where samples are divided between multiple users who can only release a limited amount of information about their samples due to various information constraints. Recently, a subset of the authors showed that having access to a common random seed (i.e., shared randomness) leads to a significant reduction in the sample complexity of this problem. In this work, we provide a complete understanding of the interplay between the amount of shared randomness available, the stringency of information constraints, and the sample complexity of the testing problem by characterizing a tight trade-off between these three parameters. We provide a general distributed goodness-of-fit protocol that as a function of the amount of shared randomness interpolates smoothly between the private-and public-coin sample complexities. We complement our upper bound with a general framework to prove lower bounds on the sample complexity of this testing problems under limited shared randomness. Finally, we instantiate our bounds for the two archetypal information constraints of communication and local privacy, and show that our sample complexity bounds are optimal as a function of all the parameters of the problem, including the amount of shared randomness.
Introduction
A prototypical example of statistical inference is that of goodness-of-fit, in which one seeks to determine whether a set of observations fits a purported probability distribution. Considered extensively in Statistics and, more recently, in computer science under the name of identity testing, the goodness-of-fit question for discrete probability distributions is by now well-understood.
Most of the recent work has focused on the sample complexity of the problem (i.e., the minimum number of observations required to solve the task), and sought to obtain sample-optimal, time-efficient algorithms (see, e.g., [BFR + 13, Pan08, ADK15, VV17, DGPP18]). In many emerging settings, however, time or even sample considerations may not be the main bottleneck. Instead, samples may only be partially accessible, or their availability may be subjected to strict information constraints. These constraints may be imposed in form of the number of bits allowed to describe each sample (communication constraints) or privacy constraints for each sample.
In this context, a recent line of work [ACT18, ACT19a] has provided sample-optimal algorithms under such information constraints. An important aspect revealed by this line of work is that shared randomness is very helpful for such problems -public-coin protocols have much lower sample complexity than private-coin protocols. However, shared randomness used by the distributed protocols may itself be an expensive commodity in practice. With an eye towards practical algorithms for deployment of these distributed statistical inference algorithms, we consider the question of randomness-efficient distributed inference algorithms.
Specifically, we consider public randomness as a resource. In our setting, n users get independent samples from an unknown k-ary distribution, and each can send a message to a central server in a one-way, non-interactive fashion. Those messages, however, have to comply with a prespecified local information constraint, such as communication (each message can be at most ℓ bits long) or local privacy (loosely speaking, messages must not divulge too much about the user's observation.) The server uses the n messages to perform the goodness-of-fit test for the unknown distribution.
Prior work considered two natural classes of protocols: private-coin, where users and server are randomized independently; and public-coin, where all parties share ahead of time a common random seed that they can leverage to coordinate their messages. Alternatively, one may view shared randomness as the communication sent over the "downlink" channel by the server to the users. In this paper, we significantly generalize prior results, by establishing a tight tradeoff between the number of users n and the number of shared random bits s required for performing inference under local information constraints.
A key component of our distributed protocols is domain compression, a new primitive we introduce. Roughly speaking, domain compression allows one to (randomly) map a large domain [k] to a much smaller domain of size L ≪ k, while ensuring that pairwise distances between probability distributions on [k] are (roughly) preserved when looking at their induced distributions on [L] . This notion can then be leveraged to obtain testing protocols from "good" domain compression mappings which use few bits of randomness.
We proceed to describe our results in the next section, before giving an overview of our techniques in the subsequent section. To put our results in context, we then provide a brief overview of prior and related work.
Our Results
We first provide an informal overview of the setting and our results. We consider identity testing, a classic example of goodness-of-fit, where one is given a reference distribution q over a known domain of size k, as well as a parameter ε ∈ (0, 1). Upon receiving n i.i.d. samples X 1 , . . . , X n from an unknown distribution p over the same domain, one must then output accept with high constant probability if p = q, and reject if the total variation distance between p and q is at least ε.
We study a distributed setting where the X i 's are distributed over n users who can only transmit a limited amount of information about their samples to a central server, which then seeks to solve the testing problem from the messages received (see Section 2 for the detailed setup, and Fig. 1 for a pictorial description). For simplicity, we focus on two main applications, communication constraints and local privacy; we point out, however, that our results are more general, and can be leveraged to obtain both upper and lower bounds for the more general class of information constraints described in [ACT18] .
The communication-constrained setting. In this setting, each user can communicate at most ℓ bits to the server. We establish the following. 
users. Moreover, this number of users is optimal, up to constant factors, for all values of k, s, ℓ.
Note that for ℓ ≥ log k, we recover the centralized (unconstrained) sample complexity of O( √ k/ε 2 ); for s = 0 and s ≥ log k, the expression matches respectively the public-and privatecoin sample complexities established in previous work.
An interesting interpretation of the sample complexity result mentioned above is that "one bit of communication is worth two bits of public randomness." Equivalently, if one interprets the public randomness as an s bit random seed sent over the downlink channel to the users, who then reply with their ℓ-bit message, then improving the capacity of the downlink channel is only half as effective as improving the user-to-server channel capacities.
The locally private setting. In this setting, there is no bound on the length of the message each user can send to the server, but the randomized mechanism W used to decide which message y to send upon seeing sample x has to satisfy ̺-local differential privacy (̺-LDP):
(Equivalently, the probability to send any given message y must stay roughly within a (1 ± ̺) multiplicative factor, regardless of which x was observed.) We prove the following. 
users. Moreover, this number of users is optimal, up to constant factors, for all values of k, s, and ̺ ∈ (0, 1].
Once again, for s = 0 and s ≥ log k, this recovers respectively the public-and privatecoin sample complexities established in [ACFT19, ACT18] . In order to establish these upper bounds, along the way we provide a sample-optimal private-coin ̺-LDP identity testing protocol (Lemma 4.7) which only requires one bit of communication per user (improving in this respect on the sample-optimal protocols of [ACFT19] ), and may be of independent interest. General local constraints. Both Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate the versatility of our approach. To establish our algorithmic upper bounds, we rely on a new primitive we call domain compression (on which we elaborate in the next subsection). Specifically, we show in Theorem 4.1 how to combine as a blackbox this primitive with a private-coin protocol for identity testing under any fixed type of local constraint to obtain a protocol for identity testing with s of public randomness, under the same local constraints.
Our proofs of optimality, similarly, are corollaries of a general lower bound framework (Lemma 5.4 and Theorem 5.5) we develop, and which extends that of [ACT18] to handle limited public randomness. We believe that both techniques -the domain compression primitive, and the general lower bound formulation -will find other applications in distributed statistical inference problems.
Our Techniques
Our proposed scheme has a modular form and, in effect, separates the use of shared randomness from the problem of establishing an information-constrained inference protocol. In particular, we use shared randomness only to enable domain compression.
Domain compression.
The problem of domain compression is to convert samples from an unknown k-ary distribution p to samples from [L], while preserving the total variation distances up to a factor of θ. Our main result here is a scheme that reduces the domain-size to roughly L ≈ kθ 2 while preserving the total variation distance up to a factor of θ. Furthermore, our randomized scheme does this using the optimal 2 log(1/θ) + O(1) bits of randomness, which will be crucial for our applications. Furthermore, as we will see later, this is the best possible "compression" -the lowest L possible -for a given θ.
In order to come up with this optimal domain compression scheme, we establish first a onebit ℓ 2 isometry for probability vectors. Namely, we present a random mapping which converts the domain to {0, 1} while preserving the ℓ 2 distances between pairs of probability vectors. We apply this scheme to non-overlapping parts of our k-ary probability vector to obtain the desired domain compression scheme. Underlying our analysis is a new anti-concentration bound for sub-Gaussian random variables, which maybe of independent interest. Domain compression to distributed testing. With this general domain compression algorithm at our disposal, we use s bits of randomness to obtain a reduction of the domain size to roughly k/2 s , while shrinking the statistical distances by a factor of 1/ √ 2 s . Now that we have exhausted all our shared randomness in domain compression, we apply the best available private-coin protocol, but one working on domain of size (k/2 s ), with new distance parameter ε/ √ 2 s in place of the original ε.
Interestingly, when instantiating this general algorithm for specific constraints of communication, it is not always optimal to use all the randomness possible. In particular, when we have ℓ bits of communication per sample available, we should compress the domain to 2 ℓ and use the best private-coin protocol for ℓ bits of communication per sample. We formally show that one bit of communication is worth two bits of shared randomness. In particular, we should not "waste" any available bit of communication from the users by using too much shared randomness.
However, this only gives us a scheme with failure probability close to 1/2 at best. To boost the probability of error to an arbitrarily small δ, the standard approach of repeating the protocol independently, unfortunately, is not an option, as we already have exhausted all available public randomness to perform the domain compression. Instead, we take recourse to a deterministic amplification technique [KPS85] , which leverages the properties of expander graphs to achieve this failure probability reduction without using any additional random bit.
Optimality. When we instantiate our general algorithm for communication and privacy constraints, we attain performance that is jointly optimal in the information constraint parameter (bits for communication and the LDP parameter for privacy), the number of samples, and the bits of shared randomness. We establish this optimality by showing chi-square fluctuation lower bounds, a technique introduced recently in [ACT18] . This approach considers the interplay between a difficult instance of the problem and the choice of the mappings satisfying information constraints by the users. The main observation is that for public-coin protocols, the users can choose the best mapping for any given instance of the problem by coordinating using shared randomness, resulting in a minmax bottleneck. On the other hand, for private-coin protocols, for each choice of mappings, the users must handle the least favorable instance, resulting in a maxmin bottleneck. To obtain our lower bounds, we need to bridge between these two extremes and provide bounds which seamlessly switch from maxmin to minmax bounds as the number of bits of shared randomness increase. We term this significant generalization of chi-square fluctuation bounds the semiminmax bound and use it obtain tight bounds for our setting.
Prior and Related Work
Goodness-of-fit has a long and rich history in Statistics, starting with the pioneering work of Pearson [Pea00] . More recently, the composite goodness-of-fit question (where one needs to distinguish between the reference distribution, and all distributions sufficiently far in total variation from it) has been investigated in the theoretical computer science community under the name identity testing [GR00, BFR + 13], with a focus on computational aspects and discrete distributions. This line of work culminated in efficient and sample-optimal testing algorithms [Pan08, VV17, ADK15, Gol16, DGPP18]; we refer the reader to the surveys [Rub12, Can15, BW18] , as well as the recent book [Gol17] (Chapter 11) for further details on identity testing, and the more general field of distribution testing.
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in distributed statistical inference, focusing on density or parameter estimation under communication constraints [HMÖW18b, HÖW18, HMÖW18a, BHÖ19] or local privacy [DJW17, EPK14, YB18, KBR16, ASZ19, AS19]. The testing counterpart, specifically identity testing, was studied in the locally differentially private (LDP) setting by Gaboardi and Rogers [GR18] and Sheffet [She18] , followed by [ACFT19] ; and in the communication-constrained setting in [ACT19c, ACT19b] , as well as by (with a slightly different focus) [FMO18] . The role of public randomness in distributed testing was explicitly studied in [ACT19c, ACT19b] , which showed a quantitative gap between the sample complexities of public-and private-coin protocols; those works, however, left open the fine-grained question of limited public randomness we study here.
Related to identity testing, a recent work of [DGKR19] considers identity testing under both memory and communication constraints. Their setting and results, however, are incomparable to ours, as the communication constraints they focus on are global (i.e., the goal is to minimize the total communication between parties), with no hard constraint on any given user's message.
Our domain compression primitive, on the other hand, fits in the area of dimensionality reduction, a term encompassing various notions whose common theme is the mapping of highdimensional objects into lower dimensions, while preserving (approximately) their relevant geometric features. In our case, the objects are elements of the (k − 1)-dimensional probability simplex, and the geometric features are the pairwise distances (mostly in ℓ 1 distance); this is, especially in view of our use of an ℓ 2 isometry to achieve this goal, reminiscent of the celebrated Johnson-Linderstrauss (JL) lemma and its many applications [JLS86, IM98] . The JL lemma, however, is for general high-dimensional vectors, and does not necessarily map from nor into the probability simplex.
Closest to our primitive is the work of Kyng, Phillips, and Venkatasubramanian [KPV10] , which considers a similar question for distributions over R d satisfying a smoothness condition. However, their results are not applicable to our setting of finite alphabet. Furthermore, we are interested in preserving the total variation distance, and not Hellinger distance considered in [KPV10] . Finally, our proposed algorithm is randomness efficient, which is crucial for our application. In contrast, the algorithm in [KPV10] for domain compression requires a random mapping similar to the JL lemma construction.
Notation and Preliminaries
In what follows, we denote by log and ln the binary and natural logarithms, respectively. For an integer k ≥ 1, we write [k] for the set {1, . . . , k}, and
x∈ [k] p(x) = 1} (where we identify a probability distribution with its probability mass function). For p, q ∈ ∆(k), recall that d TV (p, q) := sup S⊆ [k] (p(S) − q(S)) is the total variation distance between p and q, which is equal to half their ℓ 1 distance. For our lower bounds, we shall also rely on the chi-square distance between p and q, defined as
. We indicate by x ∼ p that x is a sample drawn from the distribution p.
We will use standard asymptotic notations O(f ), Ω(f ), Θ(f ), as well as the (relatively) standardÕ(f ), which hides polylogarithmic factors in its argument. 1 We will, in addition, rely on the notation a n b n (resp. a n b n ), to indicate there exists an absolute constant C > 0 such that a n ≤ C · b n (resp. a n ≥ C · b n ) for all n, and accordingly write a n ≍ b n when both a n b n and a n b n . Finally, for a matrix M ∈ R m×n , we denote by M F and M * the Frobenius and nuclear norms of M , respectively, and by ρ(M ) its spectral radius.
Setting and problem statement
In the (k, ε, δ)-identity testing problem, given a known reference distribution q ∈ ∆(k), and given i.i.d. samples from p, we seek to test if p equals q or if it is ε-far from q in total variation distance. Specifically, an (n, ε, δ)-test is given by a (randomized) mapping
That is, upon observing independent samples X n , the algorithm should "accept" with probability at least 1 − δ if the samples come from the reference distribution q and "reject" with probability at least 1 − δ if they come from a distribution significantly far from q. We will often fix the probability of failure δ to be a small constant, say 1/12, and write (k, ε)-identity testing and (n, ε)-test for (k, ε, 1/12)-identity testing and (n, ε, 1/12)-test, respectively. 2 The sample complexity of (k, ε)-identity testing is the minimum n such that we can find an (n, ε)-test, over the worst-case reference distribution q.
The information-constrained distributed model. In the private-coin setting the channels W 1 , . . . , W n are independent, while in the public-coin setting they are jointly randomized; in the s-coin setting, they are randomized based on both a joint U uniform on {0, 1} s , and on n independent r.v.'s U 1 , . . . , U n .
We work in the following distributed setting: n users each receive an independent sample from an unknown distribution p ∈ ∆(k), and must send a message to a central server, in the simultaneous-message-passing (SMP) setting. The local communication constraints are modeled by a family W of "allowed" (randomized) channels, such that each user must select a channel W ∈ W and, upon seeing their sample x, send the message y = W (x) to the central server.
Here, we focus on s-coin SMP protocols, where the users have access to both private randomness, and a limited number of uniform public random bits. Formally, s-coin SMP protocols are described as follows.
Definition 2.1 (s-coin SMP Protocols). Let U be an s-bit random variable distributed uniformly over {0, 1} s , independent of (X 1 , . . . , X n ); and let U 1 , . . . , U n denote independent random variables, which are independent jointly of (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and U . In an s-coin SMP protocol, all users are given access to U , and further user i is given access to U i . For every i ∈ [n], user i selects the channel W i ∈ W as a function of U and U i . The central server is given access to the random variable U as well and its estimator and test can depend on U ; however, it does not have access to the realization of (U 1 , . . . , U n ).
In particular, for s = 0 we recover the private-coin setting, while for s = ∞ we obtain the publiccoin setting. We then say an SMP protocol Π with n users is an (k, ε)-identity testing s-coin protocol using W with n users (resp. public-coin, resp. private-coin) if it is an s-coin SMP protocol (resp. public-coin, resp. private-coin) using channels from W which, as a whole, constitutes an (n, ε)-test.
The communication-constrained and LDP channel families. Two specific families of constraints we will consider throughout this paper are those of communication constraints, where each user can send at most ℓ bits to the server, and those of ̺-LDP channels, where the users' channels must satisfy the definition of local differentially privacy given in (1). We denote those two families, respectively, by W ℓ and W ̺ :
A useful simplification. Throughout the paper, we will assume that the domain size k is a power of two. This can be done without loss of generality and does not restrict the scope of our results; we establish this reduction formally in Appendix B.
Domain Compression from Shared Randomness
We now introduce our main algorithmic tool -a new primitive called domain compression. We believe that the application of domain compression will go beyond this work. At a high-level, the domain compression problem requires us to convert statistical inference problems over large domain size to those over a small domain size. This problem is an instance of universal compression, since it is clear that we cannot assume the knowledge of the generating distribution of the samples. We present a simple formulation which can have applications for a variety of statistical tasks. Specifically, we require that pairwise distances be preserved between the distributions induced over the smaller domain. For our work, we only formulate a specific instance of the problem; it is easy to formulate a more general version which will have applications beyond the identity-testing problem that we consider, e.g., to continuous distributions or other distance measures.
Definition 3.1 (Domain compression). For L < k, U := {0, 1} s , and a mapping Ψ :
where the randomness is over U which is distributed uniformly over U. Furthermore, we say that this domain compression mapping uses s bits of randomness.
In effect, we are asking that a DCM preserves separation in total variation distance up to a loss-factor of θ while compressing the domain-size to L. For brevity, we shall say that such a DCM compresses the domain-size to L with a loss-factor of θ.
Our main result in this section, stated below, shows that we can compress the domain-size to kθ 2 with a loss-factor of θ. Furthermore, we can do so using 2 log(1/θ) bits of randomness. 
Furthermore, this domain compression mapping uses at most 2 log(1/θ) + c 0 bits of randomness.
Stated differently, we have a DCM that compresses the domain-size to L with a loss-factor of L/k. In fact, this is the minimum loss-factor we must incur to compress the domain-size to L. Indeed, by choosing L = 2 ℓ , we can use the output of an (L, θ, δ)-DCM to enable uniformity testing using ℓ bits of communication. This output will be distributed over [2 ℓ ] and the induced distribution will be separated from the uniform distribution by at least θε in total variation distance. Thus, using e.g., the (non-distributed) uniformity test of [Pan08] , we can complete uniformity testing using √ 2 ℓ /(θ 2 ε 2 ) samples. But this must exceed the lower bound of k/(ε 2 √ 2 ℓ ) shown in [ACT18] for public-coin protocols. Therefore, θ must be less than 2 ℓ /k. We will formalize this proof of optimality later (see Section 5), when we will show that the randomness of 2 log(1/θ) bits that we use for attaining this corner-point of L versus θ tradeoff is optimal, too. Note that we can only achieve a constant δ from our scheme, which suffices for our purpose. A more general treatment of the domain-compression problem, with optimal tradeoff for all range of parameters, is an intriguing research direction.
As described, the domain compression problem requires us to preserve distances in total variation distance, which is equivalent to the ℓ 1 metric. We have setup this definition keeping in view the application of domain compression in identity-testing. In general, we can consider some other metrics. For instance, in place of Eq. (2) we can require
This is a stricter requirement since x 1 ≥ x 2 , and would imply Eq. (2). In fact, using a random partition of the domain into [L] parts, it was shown in [ACT19a, Theorem VI.2] that a loss-factor of roughly 1/ √ k can be attained for the definition of separation in Eq. (3). This in turn implies a scheme to compress domain-size to L with a loss-factor of 1/ √ k, even for the definition of separation in Eq. (2). Comparing this with the result of Theorem 3.2, we find that the performance of this random partition based DCM is off by a √ L factor from the loss-factor of L/k attained by our proposed DCM in this paper. However, there is a simple modification than can help: Instead of applying this scheme to the entire domain, we can divide the domain into smaller parts and ensure ℓ 2 separation for each part. If we divide the domain [k] into equal parts and attain ℓ 2 separation loss-factor of θ for each part, this implies an overall loss-factor of θ in ℓ 1 as well.
To enable this approach, in the result below we establish a "one-bit isometry" for ℓ 2 distances between distributions. That is, we show that a random mapping Ψ with one-bit output exists such that the ℓ 2 distance between the distribution of output is at least a constant times the ℓ 2 distance between the distribution of input. Since the output is only binary, we can express the result in terms of difference between probabilities of sets that map to 1. Note that we need this isometry not only for distribution vectors p and q, but also for subvectors of distribution vectors. 
where U is distributed uniformly over U and p(S) := i∈S p i .
In other words, there is a randomized ℓ 2 isometry for distributions over [2 s ] that uses s+c 0 bits of randomness. The most significant aspect of the previous result, which is the main workhorse for this work, is that the sets {S u } u∈U , are fixed and do not depend on vectors p and q.
As outlined above, we want to apply our one-bit isometry to parts of domain. But there is one difficulty still left in implementing this idea to obtain our desired DCM: the guarantees are only for each part and the randomness requirement to make it work for all the parts simultaneously maybe higher. The following simple, but useful, observation comes to the rescue. 
. , Y m be non-negative random variables such that for some
We defer the proof of this lemma to the appendix and of Theorem 3.3 to the end of this section. For now, we complete the proof of Theorem 3.2, our main theorem, using these results.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Consider distributions p and q from ∆(k). Set s = log(c/θ 2 ) ; then by our assumption, s ≤ t. Further, denoting J := 2 t−s , for 0 ≤ j ≤ J − 1 define the vectors p j and
We apply Theorem 3.3 to p j and q j to get
which together with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality yields
We apply the "additivity of tails" property (Lemma 3.4) to arrive at
Consider the following function Ψ with range {0, . . . , 2J − 1}: For every u ∈ U = {0, 1} s+c 0 and
The proof is completed by setting θ := 4α 2 /2 s and noting that 2J = kθ 2 /(2α 2 ).
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Denote x := p − q and consider a subset S ⊆ [2 s ]. With these notations, the event we seek to handle is ( i∈S x i ) 2 ≥ α 2 x 2 2 . We associate with S a vector u ∈ {0, 1} 2 s with ith entry given by 1 {i∈S} . Then, our of interest can be expressed as 
The main technical component of our proof is the following result. 
Specifically, we show that random binary vectors V 1 , . . . , V m will do the job. The proof is quite technical and requires a careful analysis of the spectrum of the random matrix
In particular, effort is required to handle entries of V j with nonzero mean; we provide the complete proof in Appendix A.
We use vectors of Theorem 3.5, which implies that for vectors u 1 , . . . , u m of Theorem 3.5 inequality (6) can hold only for |J | < (1 − c 1 )m. Therefore,
whereby the claim follows for sets S i , i ∈ [m], given by S i = supp(u i ) with δ 0 := c 1 and c 2 := α 2 .
Applications: Distributed Testing via Domain Compression
In this section, we show how the notion of domain compression developed in Section 3 yields distributed protocols for identity testing under local information constraints. Specifically, we show in Section 4.1 how to combine any private-coin identity testing protocol using W with an s-coin domain compression scheme to obtain an s-coin identity tester using W. Then, in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we instantiate this general algorithm with W = W ℓ and W = W ̺ to obtain s-coin identity testing protocols under communication and local privacy constraints, respectively.
The General Algorithm
We establish the following result characterizing the performance of our general algorithm. A few remarks are in order. First, we may view (and we will illustrate this in the following sections) this statement as saying that "an optimal private-coin testing protocol under local constraints yields, as a blackbox, an optimal s-coin testing protocol under the same local constraints, using domain compression." Second, in some cases (such as Section 4.2), it is beneficial to use this blackbox method, with a number of public coins s strictly smaller than the number of available public coins. Namely, we do better by ignoring some of the shared randomness resource. This is seemingly paradoxical, but the following heuristic may help resolve this conundrum: reducing the domain "too much" may prevent the private-coin tester from using fully what the local constraints allow. Concretely, in the case of communication constraints where each player can send ℓ bits, reducing the domain size below 2 ℓ means that some bits of communication cannot be utilized. Third, and foremost, this theorem hints at the versatility of our notion of domain compression and the simplicity of its use: (i) use public coins to reduce the domain while preserving the pairwise distances; (ii) run a private-coin protocol on the induced distributions, on the smaller domain.
Overview of the proof. Before delving into the details of the proof, we provide an outline of the argument. Suppose we have an identity testing private-coin protocol Π using W. Given s of public randomness, we use the domain compression protocol from the previous section to reduce the domain size from k to L ≈ k/2 s , while shrinking the total variation distances by a factor θ ≈ 1/ √ 2 s . This entirely uses the s bits of public randomness, after which it suffices to use the private-coin Π to test identity of the induced distribution p ′ ∈ ∆(L) to the induced reference distribution q ′ ∈ ∆(L) with distance parameter θ · ε ≈ ε/ √ 2 s . Note that q ′ is known by all parties, as it is solely a function of q and the public randomness; and the players, after the domain compression, hold i.i.d. samples from p ′ . Since the only communication between the parties occur when running the protocol Π (which by assumption uses channels from W), the resulting protocol satisfies the local constraints modeled by W.
This clean approach is indeed the main element of our algorithm. The issue, however, is that the domain compression only guarantees distance preservation with some constant probability δ 0 . Therefore, when p is ε-far from q, the approach above can only guarantee correctness of the overall protocol with probability at most δ 0 . In other words, the proposed protocol has low soundness. When p = q, however, the domain compression obviously yields p ′ = q ′ with probability one, so the completeness guarantee holds. A standard approach to handle this would be to amplify the success probability by independent parallel repetitions, costing only a small constant factor overhead in the number of players. However, this is not an option for our setting, since independent repetitions would require fresh public randomness, which we do not have anymore. Further, dividing the public randomness in different random seeds and using these disjoint seeds to run this amplification-by-repetition idea would be suboptimal, as d repetitions would result in weaker domain compression -we will get domain of cardinality k/2 s/d instead of the desired k/2 s .
To circumvent this issue, we use a different approach, that of deterministic amplification introduced in [KPS85] . The idea is indeed to run the protocol several times, say d, to amplify the probability of success, but carefully reusing the same s bit public randomness U = r for all the d runs. Namely, we can find suitable mappings π 1 , . . . , π d : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} s such that upon running a protocol separately for (correlated) random seeds π 1 (r), π 2 (r), . . . , π d (r) and aggregating the results of the d distinct runs, we can amplify the success probability from 1/3 to ≈ 1 − 1/d. Specifically, we rely on the deterministic amplification lemma below, which guarantees that we can drive the error from any given constant to δ paying a factorÕ(1/δ) penalty in the runtime (i.e., the number of parallel runs of the protocol, and therefore also number of players), but without using a single extra bit of public randomness. 
For completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of this result in Appendix C. Using the lemma above, we can provide a straightforward algorithm to increase soundness: given public randomness r ∈ {0, 1} s , we can divide the players in d disjoint groups for some suitable (constant) d. Group i then runs the natural protocol we discussed, using π i (r) ∈ {0, 1} s as its public randomness; and the server, upon seeing the outcomes of these d not-quite-independent protocols, aggregates them to produce the final outcome.
Remark 4.3 (Universality of our algorithm). Our proposed algorithm is universal in that the players are not required to know the reference distribution q (in contrast to previous work [ACT19a, ACFT19] , which relied on a reduction to uniformity testing). The same protocol for choosing W s from W works for any identity testing problem: the knowledge of q is only required for the center to complete the test.
We are now in position to provide the detailed proof of Theorem 4.1; the pseudocode of the resulting protocol is given in Algorithm 2.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We hereafter set the constants c 0 , c, δ 0 to be as in the statement of Theorem 3.2. Fix a reference distribution q ∈ ∆(k), and let PRIVATEIDENTITYTESTING W be a (k, ε)-identity testing private-coin protocol using W with n(k, ε) players; with a slight abuse of notation, we will use the same name to invoke it with probability of failure δ for any chosen δ ∈ (0, 1), using n(k, ε, δ) := n(k, ε) · 72 ln(1/δ) players. 3 Further, denote by Ψ : 
When this happens, for this i * the protocol run by the players in Γ i * will output ν i * = 1 (reject) with probability at least 1 − δ ′ , and therefore by a union bound the server outputs 1 (reject) with probability at least 1 − (1/24 + δ ′ ) ≥ 1 − 1/12.
Number of samples. The analysis above requires that
Algorithm 1 Domain compression protocol DOMAINCOMPRESSION Require: Parameters k > 1, s ≥ 1 with k a power of two; X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ [k] distributed among n players, random seed u ∈ {0, 1} s available to all players. Ensure: All players compute values L, θ, and obtain independent samples
4:
Player j maps their sample All players agree on a uniformly random R ∈ {0, 1} s . ⊲ This uses s public coins.
8:
else ⊲ If too few public coins are available, use directly the private-coin protocol.
11: Let q (i) be the reference distribution induced by DOMAINCOMPRESSION run on π i (R).
16:
In the two next subsections, we will illustrate the versatility of Theorem 4.1 by applying it to ℓ-bit local communication constraints and ̺-local privacy constraints, respectively, to obtain sample-optimal protocols.
Communication-Constrained Testing
In the communication-constrained setting each player can only send ℓ < log k bits to the server: i.e., W = W ℓ , where W ℓ = {W : [k] → {0, 1} ℓ }. We establish the following theorem: Theorem 4.4. For any integers ℓ ≥ 1, s ≥ 0, there exists an ℓ-bit communication protocol with s bits of public randomness using
As we shall see in Section 5, this is sample-optimal.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. We note first that for ℓ ≥ log k, the setting becomes equivalent to the centralized setting, and the claimed expression becomes O( √ k/ε 2 ), the (known) tight centralized sample complexity. Thus, it is sufficient to focus on 1 ≤ ℓ < log k, which we hereafter do. To apply Theorem 4.1, we utilize the simulate-and-infer private-coin identity testing protocol of [ACT19a] . Specifically, we invoke the following result from [ACT19a] , which gives a sampleoptimal private-coin identity testing protocol Π ℓ using W ℓ :
Theorem 4.5 ([ACT19a, Corollary IV.3]). For any integer ℓ ≥ 1, there exists a private-coin (k, ε, δ)-identity testing protocol using W ℓ and
n = O k 2 ℓ ε 2 k log 1 δ + log 1 δ
players. In particular, for constant δ this becomes n(k, ε)
2 ℓ ε 2 . Armed with this protocol Π ℓ , we proceed as follows. Sets ← min(log(k)−ℓ, s) to be the "effective" number of usable public coins (intuitively, if more than log k − ℓ public coins are available, it is not worth using them all, as compressing the domain below 2 ℓ would render some of the ℓ available bits of communication useless).
• Ifs ≤ c 0 (where c 0 is the constant from the statement of Theorem 3.2), then we simply run the private-coin protocol Π ℓ . This requires
• Else, we apply Theorem 4.1 withs bits of public randomness and private-coin identity testing protocol Π ℓ . This can be done as long as
where the last identity holds sinces = (log(k) − ℓ) ∧ s. This concludes the proof.
Locally Differentially Private Testing
In this section, we consider the locally private channel family, where each player can only send a message that is ̺-LDP. That is, recalling Eq. (1), we consider the channel family
We establish the following result for performance of our proposed general algorithm for testing under privacy constraints. It will be seen in the next section that, much like the communicationconstrained setting, for the privacy-constrained setting as well our general algorithm is optimal. 
In [ACFT19] , it was shown that the sample complexity for identity testing with ̺-local differential privacy constraints is Θ(k 3/2 /(ε 2 ̺ 2 )) using only private randomness and Θ(k/(ε 2 ̺ 2 )) with (unlimited) public randomness. 6 Theorem 4.6 matches these bounds in both cases. Moreover, we note here that for private-coin schemes, we can achieve the optimal sample complexity with a one-bit communication protocol. This is in contrast with the private-coin protocols of [ACFT19] which require Ω(log k) bits of communication per player. This also shows that, unlike the communication-constrained setting, under LDP constraints there is no tradeoff between the number of available bits of communication and sample complexity.
Proof. We will rely on the following lemma, which improves on the private-coin protocol of [ACFT19] in terms of communication complexity (while achieving the same sample complexity). The protocol is inspired by that of [AS19] , which provides a one-bit LDP protocol for distribution learning.
Lemma 4.7. There exists a one-bit communication private-coin ̺-LDP protocol that uses
ε 2 ̺ 2 . We defer the proof for this intermediate result to Section 4.3.1, and continue the proof of the theorem assuming the statement. Let us denote by Π ̺ the protocol from Lemma 4.7; we then proceed as follows:
• If s ≤ c 0 (where c 0 is the constant from the statement of Theorem 3.2), then we just run the private-coin protocol Π ̺ .
• Else, we apply Theorem 4.1 withs = min(log k, s) bits of public randomness and privatecoin identity testing protocol Π ̺ . This can be done as long as
the last equality recalling thats = (log k) ∧ s.
Proof of Lemma 4.7
It only remains to prove Lemma 4.7, our intermediary result giving a communication-efficient private-coin protocol for identity testing under LDP. We emphasize that the main advantage of this protocol is that we require only one bit of communication per player as compared to Ω(log k) for those of [ACFT19] , while in terms of sample complexity both protocols are optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. We use the same response scheme as in [AS19] . The scheme is the following. Let K := 2 ⌈log 2 (k+1)⌉ , which is the smallest power of two larger than k. Let H K be the K × K Hadamard matrix. Without loss of generality, we assume K divides n (as otherwise we can ignore the last (n − K n K ) players). Deterministically partition divide the players into K disjoint blocks of equal size B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B K . Each player i ∈ B j is assigned the jth column of the Hadamard matrix. Let C j be the location of +1's on the jth column; the channel used by player i ∈ B j is given by
Then, following the same computations as in [AS19] , we have that for all j ∈ [K],
Taking one player from each block and viewing the resulting collection of messages as a length-K vector, we thus get n/K samples from a product distribution on {0, 1} K with mean vector
. From a Parseval-based argument analogous to [ACFT19] , we then know that
where q C ∈ [0, 1] K is the mean vector obtained as above when the input distribution is q instead of p. (Note that q C can be explicitly computed given knowledge of q.) Therefore, when
(e ̺ +1) 2 ε 2 , while p C − q C 2 2 = 0 when p = q. Since, for product distributions over {0, 1} K , the problem of testing whether the mean vector is either (i) a prespecified vector µ ∈ R K or (ii) at ℓ 2 distance at least α from µ has sample complexity
as claimed. Finally, the fact that this protocol does, indeed, satisfy the ̺-LDP constraints is immediate from Eq. (7).
Lower Bounds
Our lower bounds consist of the following ingredients. In Section 5.1, we introduce the notion of semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation of a family of channels W, which will be central to our results. In Theorem 5.5 we provide an upper bound on the semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation as a function of H(W ) * . We then, in the corresponding following sections, use Lemma 5.4, in conjunction with the bounds on H(W ) * for communication-constrained and locally private channels, to prove our lower bounds in those two settings and establish the lower bound part of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2.
As we aim to prove a lower bound on the sample complexity of identity testing (for general reference distribution q), it is enough to show a lower bound on its special case of uniformity testing. This is a sensible choice, as the uniform distribution u k is the "hardest" instance of identity testing (see e.g., [Pan08, Gol16] ).
The General Formulation: Semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation
We build on the notions of maxmin and minmax decoupled chi-square fluctuations, introduced in [ACT18] to prove lower bounds on the sample complexity of SMP protocols with and without public randomness, respectively. The maxmin fluctuation results in a bottleneck for private-coin protocols and the minmax for public-coin protocols. To obtain our lower bounds, we generalize these and define the notion of semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation, which interpolates between the maxmin and minmax fluctuations and captures the setting of limited public randomness.
In order to do so, we first recall the definition of perturbations around a fixed distribution q ∈ ∆(k).
Definition 5.1 ([ACT18, Definition IV.4]). Consider 0 < ε < 1, a family of distributions P = {p z , z ∈ Z}, and a distribution ζ on Z. The pair
for some α ≥ 1/10. We denote the set of all almost ε-perturbations by Υ ε . Moreover, for α = 1 we refer to P as a perturbed family. . Consider a perturbed family P = {p z : z ∈ Z} and a family of channels W. The n-fold induced decoupled chi-square fluctuation of P for W n ∈ W n is given by
It was shown in previous work that χ (2) (W n | P) is an upper bound on the chi-square distance over the n channel output distributions induced by the almost ε-perturbation, and q; in particular, for any testing protocol to be successful, this quantity must be bounded away from zero. After these definitions, we are now in position to introduce the main tool underlying our randomness tradeoff lower bound, the new notion of semimaxmin fluctuation: 
where the supremum is over all multisets W s of W n of size at most 2 s , the infimum is over all almost ε-perturbations P ζ , and the expectation over the uniform choice of W n from W s .
One may observe that when s = 0 and s = ∞, respectively, replacing the expectation by a supremum yields the maxmin and minmax formulations from previous work. Here, we consider instead an inner expectation, as it makes it easier to bound the resulting quantity in practicewhile making the proof of Lemma 5.4 only slightly more technical. Note that in the definition we take a supremum over 2 s choices of W n to capture the fact that there are s public bits which determine the distribution over the channels. If only s bits of public randomness are available, we will show that any test using channels from W will err with large constant probability if the above quantity χ (2) (W n , ε, s) is upper bounded by a sufficiently small constant.
Lemma 5.4 (Semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation bound for testing). For 0 < ε < 1, s ∈ N, and a k-ary reference distribution p, the sample complexity n = n(k, ε, s) of (k, ε)-identity testing with s bits of public randomness using W must satisfy
for some constant c > 0 depending only on the probability of error.
Proof. The proof uses Le Cam's two-point method. Consider an almost ε-perturbation P ζ : we note first that, due the use of private coins, the effective channel used by each user is a convex combination of channels from W, namely it is a channel from W. Thus, when X n has distribution either p n and p n z , respectively, Y n has distribution p W n and p W n z with W n ∈ W n . The public randomness then allow the users to jointly sample from any distribution on W n which can be sampled by s independent unbiased bits, that is from any uniform distribution on a multiset W s ⊆ W n of size (at most) 2 s . Now, for every choice of channels W n = (W 1 , . . . , W n ) ∈ W n , by Pinsker's inequality and the concavity of logarithm,
Also, we have the trivial bound
Over the uniformly random choice of W n U ∈ W s (using the public randomness U ), we then have using the concavity of square roots,
We then bound the right-side further using [ACT18, Lemma III.V] with θ replaced by z,
. That is, we have 8
Consider an (n, ε)-test T using a public-coin protocol. Denote by U the public randomness and by Y 1 , . . . , Y n the messages from each user and by Z 0 the set of z such that
where the last inequality relies on the fact that α ≥ 1/10. Equivalently,
An important remark here is that the distribution of W n U (that is, the choice of W s ⊆ W n ) does not depend on P ζ . The left-hand-side of Eq. (10) above coincides with the Bayes error for test T for the simple binary hypothesis testing problem of E p
8 Dropping the constant 1/2 for simplicity of the resulting bound.
Thus, we can find W s such that for W n U distributed uniformly on W s and any almost ε-perturbations
which along with Eq. (9) yields
where c = 1/14400. The result follows upon taking minimum over all almost ε-perturbations P ζ and the maximum over all multisets W s ∈ W n of size at most 2 s .
In view of Lemma 5.4, it then suffices to come up with a particular reference distribution q of our choosing, and, for any type of constraint W, to upper bound χ (2) (W n , ε, s) as a function of k, ε, s and (some quantity of) W. To do so, recalling the definition of semimaxmin decoupled chi-square fluctuation (Definition 5.3), it suffices to do the following: for each fixed W s ⊆ W n of size at most 2 s , construct an almost ε-perturbation P ζ = (P, ζ) around our q such that E χ (2) (W n | P ζ ) is small enough. As previously mentioned, we will choose our reference distribution q to be the uniform distribution u k . Our almost perturbations will consist of "small local perturbations" around uniform, and be of the form
where Z is drawn for a suitably chosen distribution ζ on R k/2 . Note that taking ζ to be uniform on {−1, 1} k/2 , we retrieve the "Paninski construction" [Pan08] , widely used to prove lower bounds in the centralized, unconstrained setting. Unfolding the definition of decoupled chi-square perturbation, the form chosen in (12) for our perturbation then naturally leads to the following channel-dependent matrix H(W ), which will guide the choice of the "worst possible mixture ζ over Z" for a given family of channels. For each channel W ∈ W, let the (k/2)-by(k/2) positive semidefinite matrix H(W ) be defined as
This matrix will, loosely speaking, capture the ability of channel W to discriminate between even and odd inputs, and thus to distinguish the reference uniform distribution from such a mixture of perturbed distributions. Our bounds will rely on the nuclear norm H(W ) * of the matrix H(W ). In effect, our results characterize the informativeness of a channel W for testing in terms of the nuclear norm of H(W ). Channels with larger nuclear norms provide more information, and the channel constraints impose a bound on the nuclear norms, which leads to our result:
Theorem 5.5. Given n ∈ N, ε ∈ (0, 1), s ∈ N, for a channel family W the (n, ε, s)-semimaxmin chi-square fluctuation is bounded as
where C > 0 is a constant.
The proof of this theorem is quite technical, and is provided in Appendix D. We here give an outline of the argument.
Proof of Theorem 5.5 (Sketch). In view of the discussion above, we would like, given any multiset W s of 2 s n-fold channels W n , to design a suitable distribution for our perturbation Z which "fools" all (or most) of the 2 s channels. Loosely speaking, we would like to construct a distribution for which (informally) most of variance falls in subspaces corresponding to small eigenvectors for a large fraction of the matrices H(W i ). To do so, we proceed along the same lines as the proof of [ACT18, Theorem IV.18] (hereafter denoted (⋆)), reducing the problem to finding a distribution of the perturbation vector Z such that, for any fixed (multi)set W s ⊆ W n of size at most 2 s , the expectation
, is small. Using a similar argument, it suffices to find a matrix V such that (i) V 2 F k, (ii) each row of V has 2-norm at most 1, and (iii) the average (over
Since all the matricesH(W n ) (and therefore all V ⊺H (W n )V 's) are symmetric positive semidefinite matrices, one can then show that
Using a construction from (⋆) applied toH(W s ) := W n ∈WsH (W n ), we obtain a matrix V satisfying the above conditions (i) and (ii), and such that we have the following analogue of (iii):
Combining this inequality with (15) and the triangle inequality, this leads to
From (17), we can finally derive the desired bound in a manner analogous to the end of (⋆). This is however not entirely immediate, as (by our very construction), we can only guarantee small Frobenius norms and spectral radius on average for the V ⊺H (W n )V 's. The original argument of (⋆), however, crucially requires during its last step a pointwise guarantee; to conclude, we thus must resort to a careful averaging argument over these spectral radii to ensure most of them are under control, and handle the small remaining "bad" fraction separately. More specifically, this last part hinges on the inner min in the definition of semimaxmin fluctuation: when bounding the quantity E W n [χ (2) (W n | P ζ ) ∧ 1] in the end, we control the pointwise contribution of the "good" W n 's via the term χ (2) (W n | P ζ ) (which we show is then ≪ 1), and the contribution of the "bad" W n 's via the term 1 (which, while large, is weighted by the fraction of "bad" channels, which is itself small enough).
Communication-Constrained and LDP Testing
We now instantiate the general lower bound result established in the previous section to the two specific settings we consider, communication and local privacy constraints. For communicationconstrained and LDP channels the nuclear norms of the H matrices can be uniformly bounded as follows. Using these bounds, we readily obtain our sample complexity results for both communicationconstrained and LDP channels.
Theorem 5.7. For 0 < ε < 1 and ℓ, s ∈ N, the sample complexity of (k, ε)-uniformity testing with s bits of public randomness using W ℓ is at least
Theorem 5.8. For 0 < ̺ < 1, and s ∈ N the sample complexity of (k, ε)-uniformity testing with s bits of public randomness using W ̺ is at least
Indeed, from Lemma 5.4, we get that χ (2) (W n , ε, s) must be lower bounded by a constant for n samples to be sufficient for testing. Plugging in the bounds from Lemma 5.6 in Theorem 5.5 yields the two above results. 
Consider random, independent binary vectors V 1 , . . . , V m 0 ∈ {0, 1} n , with each V i drawn uniformly from the set of all binary vectors of length n. We establish Theorem A.1 using probablistic argument. It would be enough to show that:
First, for any J with |J | = m ≥ (1 − θ)m 0 , we will derive an exponential upper bounds for the probability,
Without loss of generality, we can assume
we first establish an exponential upper bound for
We derive this bound using a general anti-concentration bound for subgaussian random variables, which may be of independent interest. 
To prove this result, we take recourse to the following "clipped-tail" version of Hoeffding bound, which allows us to obtain exponential anti-concentration bounds using anti-concentration bounds.
Lemma A.3 (Clipped-tail Hoeffding bound). For t > 0, let X 1 , . . . , X m be nonnegative, independent random variables satisfying
Proof. Since X i s are nonnegative,
where the right-side is bounded above further by exp(−mα 2 /2) using Hoeffding's inequality and the assumption of the lemma.
We use this bound to now complete the proof of Theorem A.2.
Proof of Theorem A.2. Let Y be zero-mean and subgaussian with variance parameter σ 2 . Then, for X = Y +µ, we get E X 4 ≤ 8E Y 4 +8µ 4 . Also, since Y is subgaussian with variance parameter σ 2 , it is easy to show that E Y 4 ≤ 8σ 2 , whereby we get E X 4 ≤ 64σ 4 + 8µ 4 . Since by our assumption E X 2 = E Y 2 + µ 2 ≥ ησ 2 + µ 2 , it follows that E X 2 2 ≥ η 2 σ 4 + µ 4 . Upon combining this with the previous bound, we obtain E X 4 ≤ 64 η 2 E X 2 2 . We now invoke the Paley-Zygmund inequality to get
Finally, an application of Lemma A.3 yields
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem A.1. Let 1 be the all one vector in R n . We apply Theorem A.2 to 
Denote by A m the random matrix
Our goal is to bound λ min (A m ). It will be convenient to introduce a new norm · ⋆ on R n : for x ∈ R n ,
is linear. Now, if we can find an x such that x ⊺ A m x < λ x 2 2 , then y = x/ x ⋆ has y ⋆ = 1 and satisfies y ⊺ A m y < λ. Therefore, Pr min
We use Eq. (18) to obtain this bound, together with an appropriate netting argument. Specifically, let N be a δ-net of the sphere { y ∈ R n : y ⋆ = 1 } in the norm · ⋆ . We can find such a net with |N | ≤ (1 + 
We bound y ⊺ A m y for a y with y ⋆ = 1 by relating it to x ⊺ A m x for a vector x ∈ N such that x − y ⋆ . While this is he standard netting argument, there is added complication since we need to work with the norm · ⋆ .
In particular, for a y such that y ⋆ consider an x ∈ N satisfying x − y ⋆ ≤ δ. Denoting z := y − x, we decompose z = z + z ⊥ , where z ∈ span R (1), and z
Summing over i and using the expression for z , we get
To proceed further, we derive bounds for random variables (1 ⊺ A m 1) and (z
For the first term, we can show
We provide a proof at the end. For the second term, we observe that
Denote by V i a random variable which takes values 1/2 and −1/2 with equal probabilities, and by A m the random matrix (1/m)
The next result, whose proof is standard and will be given later, provides a bound for λ max (A m ).
Lemma A.4. There exist constants c 2 , c 3 such that
This result, together with Eq. (21) and Eq. (22), yields Pr min
where we used z 2 ⋆ ≥ z ⊥ 2 2 + (z ⊺ 1) 2 . We set t = δ 2 and note that for any x ∈ N we must have
Setting δ such that c 5 δ 2 (1 + δ) 2 = c 2 /4, it follows from Eq. (18) that
Upon combining the bounds above, we get Pr min
where δ, c 2 , c 3 are constants. Recalling Eq. (19), we have obtained
Finally, by a union bound of all subsets of [m 0 ] with size larger than (1 − θ)m 0 , we get
where h(·) denotes the binary entropy function, and we have used the fact that the number of subsets of [m 0 ] of cardinality greater than (1 − θ)m 0 , θ ∈ (0, 1/2), is at most m 0 2 m 0 h(θ) . The proof is completed by ensuring that the exponent on right-side above is negative.
It only remains to prove Eq. (22) and Lemma A.4, which we do next.
Proof of Eq. (22). Consider random variables ξ
. Note that E[ξ i ] = n/2 and each ξ i is subgaussian with variance parameter n/4. Therefore, Pr
Furthermore, since E (ξ i − n/2) 2 = n/4, the random variable (ξ i −n/2) 2 −n/4 is subexponential with parameter 4n, which gives Pr
which leads to the claimed bound. Next, consider a δ-net N 2 of the unit ball under · 2 of cardinality |N 2 | ≤ e 2n/δ . For a y such that y 2 = 1 and y ⊺ A m y = λ max (A m ), consider the x ∈ N 2 such that y − x 2 ≤ δ. Then, since
which further gives
Also, every x ∈ N 2 satisfies x 2 ≤ 1 + δ, a and so, by the tail-probability bound for m i=1 ζ 2 i that we saw above, we get Pr
exp (2n/δ − m/2). Therefore, we obtain
In particular, we can set δ = 1/4 to get the claimed result with c 2 = 425/32 and c 3 = 8.
We close with a proof of Lemma 3.4, which we recall below for easy reference. 
Proof. 
Taking γ := 1/2 yields the claim.
B Miscellaneous: some useful lemmas
We provide in this appendix two simple results, mentioned in the preliminaries. We begin with a simple proposition, which allowed us throughout the paper on to assume that one can partition the domain [k] into any number L of equal-sized sets. Indeed, as shown below, when aiming to perform (k, ε)-identity testing this can always be achieved at the cost of only a constant multiplicative factor in the distance parameter ε (and only requires private randomness, as well as knowledge of k and L, from the n users). 
Further, there exists a randomized mapping
Proof. We define Φ k,L as a mixture of the input and the uniform distribution on
is immediate to verify that all the claimed properties hold.
Applying the above with L := 2 ⌊log k⌋ , we in particular get the following: Corollary B.2. Let k ≥ 1 be any integer, and define k ′ := 2 ⌈log k⌉ ∈ [k, 2k). There exists an explicit mapping
In view of this corollary, we without loss of generality can assume throughout that k is a power of two.
C Omitted proof: Deterministic Amplification
In this appendix, we provide for completeness a proof of Lemma 4.2, the "deterministic error reduction" lemma we used in the argument of Theorem 4.1. The idea underlying this deterministic error reduction for RP is well-known, and was introduced by Karp 
where e(S, T ) = { (u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ S, v ∈ T }.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.2, restated below. To see why the claimed properties hold, first note that whenever x ∈ X 0 , then as A has onesided error we have A(x, π i (σ)) ∈ E for all i with probability one. To establish the second item, fix x / ∈ X 0 , and define B x ⊆ {0, 1} s as the set of "bad" random seeds, i.e., those on which A errs: Since every σ ∈B x has d "bad" neighbors, we must have |e(B x , B x )| ≥ d|B x |. Applying the Expander Mixing Lemma (Theorem C.1), we get
which implies, recalling the above bounds on both |B x | and |B x |,
which is at most γ by our choice of λ. Therefore, for every x / ∈ X 0 , Pr σ x ∈B x ≤ γ, establishing the high-soundness statement.
The bound on d, as well as the time efficiency statement, finally follow from the following construction of expanders, due to Bilu and Linial: to which we apply a construction of Acharya, Canonne, and Tyagi, whose properties we summarize below. 
We can now bound E W n [χ (2) (W n | P ζ )]. Let c > 0 be the constant from the statement of Lemma 5.4. Setting λ := (β 2 nε 2 )/k and recalling our assumption (Eq. (23)) on n, we have
where the second inequality is Eq. (27) and ρ(A) denotes the spectral norm of matrix A. By Markov's inequality, we have that
9 We note that this second item is a consequence of the first, along with Khintchine's inequality and an anticoncentration argument; see [ACT18, Claim IV.21 This gives, for any W n ∈ G,
From there, by concavity and using Jensen's inequality, we obtain 
